As Saudi diplomacy seeks to portray Riyadh as a mediator for peace in Sudan and a hub for negotiations, developments on the ground and within security circles reveal another dimension of Saudi policy – one centered on steering the war from behind the scenes through intelligence recruitment and the strategic absorption of defected commanders. In this context, the debate is no longer limited to who controls the battlefield, but extends to which regional capitals provide protection, rehabilitation, and safe haven for military figures accused of grave wartime abuses, most notably Ali Rizqallah, widely known as “Al-Safana.”
Riyadh: A Sanctuary for Strategic Realignment
The defection of Ali Rizqallah “Al-Safana,” the former Kordofan operations commander in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has evolved beyond Sudan’s domestic conflict and entered the sphere of regional intelligence calculations centered in Riyadh. Born in 1990 and affiliated with the Rizeigat tribe, Al-Safana has long been associated with tribal confrontations and armed conflicts across Sudan’s western regions. His departure from Sudan — through India for medical treatment before arriving in Saudi Arabia — has been viewed by many observers not as a routine journey, but as part of a sophisticated security arrangement allegedly coordinated at the intelligence level.

Political and military indicators suggest that Al-Safana’s current stay in Riyadh is not simply that of an exiled commander or political defector, but part of a broader strategy of “recruitment and reintegration.” Having fought intense battles both against the Sudanese army in previous years and later against RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” Al-Safana possesses extensive field intelligence and deep tribal influence throughout Darfur and Kordofan. These assets reportedly made him highly valuable to Saudi intelligence circles seeking to reposition him as a strategic lever within Sudan’s fragmented power struggle.
Saudi Arabia’s Covert Role: Intelligence and Battlefield Engineering
Riyadh’s alleged protection of Al-Safana has intensified scrutiny over Saudi Arabia’s hidden role in Sudan’s civil war — a role critics argue goes far beyond diplomatic sponsorship into the realm of military coordination and intelligence operations favoring the Sudanese army. While Saudi officials publicly emphasize neutrality between the warring factions, reports and regional observations suggest that indirect channels of support and security coordination have been used to reinforce the army’s position and weaken the RSF internally.
One of the most significant tactics attributed to this strategy is the dismantling of RSF loyalty networks through the attraction of influential commanders and tribal figures. According to observers, Saudi security institutions have facilitated coordination between defected commanders, including figures such as Keikal inside Sudan and Al-Safana abroad — and Sudanese military leadership. Such coordination allegedly provides defectors with unofficial protection, financial assistance, and military backing, effectively transforming them from controversial militia leaders accused of abuses into recognized military allies operating under the Sudanese army’s umbrella with regional intelligence endorsement.
Rebranding Militias, Delaying Accountability
Human rights observers and political analysts warn that the policy of absorbing and repurposing controversial militia figures may not lead to peace, but instead risks prolonging the war while reshaping militias under new political and military identities. The underlying message reaching Sudan’s fractured landscape, they argue, is alarming: loyalty shifts and battlefield realignments can erase accountability for past actions.
As reports continue to document atrocities committed in Darfur, Kordofan, and Al-Jazira, critics contend that providing sanctuary and political cover for commanders linked to these abuses undermines any realistic path toward justice. In this environment, the Sudanese people’s demands for accountability increasingly appear secondary to geopolitical calculations and regional influence struggles.
Ultimately, the contrast remains striking between the language of peace promoted at diplomatic forums and the intelligence-driven realities unfolding behind closed doors. The story of Al-Safana and his reported presence in Riyadh highlights how Sudan’s conflict has evolved into more than a domestic war becoming instead a battleground shaped by regional intelligence competition, where the suffering of civilians risks being overshadowed by the pursuit of power and strategic dominance.